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Abstract 
The idea, formulated for the first time by Pauli, of a “creativity” of natural processes on a quantum 
scale is briefly investigated, with particular reference to the phenomena, common throughout the 
biological world, involved in the amplification of microscopic “creative” events at macroscopic 
level.  The involvement of non-locality is also discussed with reference to the synordering of 
events, a concept introduced for the first time by Bohm. Some convergences are proposed between 
the metamorphic process envisaged by Bohm and that envisaged by Goethe, and some possible 
applications concerning known biological phenomena are briefly discussed. 
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Introduction 
Not many researchers today would be convinced that the Naturphilosophie approach to the 
knowledge of nature would return.  Even though excellent arguments have been provided to support 
this return (Card [1996]), there is no doubt that it meets a great deal of resistance.  In fact it is vital 
that the assumptions of the Natural Philosophy are reformulated in order to harmonize them with 
contemporary natural sciences. It is necessary to recover the contrast between the causal, local and 
mechanistic descriptions which these sciences have chosen and the holistic, morphological and 
qualitative inclination that has always characterised the philosophy of nature.  Is this possible?  
Does an authentic form of “creativity” in natural world exist, one that is not a mere epiphenomenon 
of basic causal and deterministic processes? And how should these unpredictable “creative” 
phenomena be described, since they cannot be represented by the predictive models formulated in 
the context of the mechanical causality?  Could these descriptions utilise the same concepts familiar 
to the once professed Naturphilosophie such as “archetype” (Goethe’s Urbild) or “metamorphosis”?  
In the attempt to address such difficult questions, and without any pretence of resolving them, we 
will take into consideration not the specific aspects of the naturalistic realm, but those of 
microphysics.  If we wish to reformulate these questions in really innovative terms we must begin 
our investigation at molecule level, from the atoms and from the subatomic particles.  Subsequently, 
we will be in a better position to discuss the macroscopic world of daily experience and its 
environment, the biosphere. 
 
 
Quantum level : the physical world as a network of events  
One of the fundamental aspects of the structure of matter is atomism: each physical object is an 
aggregate of homogenous entities subdivided in classes of elements identical to each other.   Among 
these we can enumerate the atoms and molecules: all the atoms of iron in a determined quantum 
state are identical, and the same applies to water molecules.  The set of the internal states of each of 
these micro-entities is generally discrete, not continuous; this characteristic is not common in 
macroscopic objects, whose configurations generally can be varied continuously.  
Molecules and atoms are not elementary: clashing against each other at sufficiently high energy, 
these entities are broken into smaller entities, such as electrons and nuclei, thus they are no longer 
atoms nor molecules. Entities are considered elementary when, however high the energy involved 
in the collision process, the products obtained still belong to the same class of reagents.  This occurs 
to those micro-entities called “elementary particles”, such as electrons, protons, neutrons, etc. 
The term particle is derived from the Latin word particula, i.e. small part. It reminds us of that 
particular entity that in classical physics is called “material point”: a point provided with mass that 
moves describing a trajectory in space and persisting for a determined time.  This image has 
generated an infinite number of controversies over the real nature of elementary particles, which are 
not the material points of classical physics. In fact the material point is an abstraction that does not 
have a genuine counterpart in nature other than as an idealization that can be mapped on certain 
classical physical systems in some circumstances (i.e. “small” object of negligible size), and 
dynamics of micro-entities such as atoms, subatomic particles, nuclei is in effect completely 
different to that of the classical macroscopic objects.  Micro-dynamics is described, at a level today 
considered fundamental, by the quantum field theory, while a more approximate description is 
given by quantum mechanics.  Since the aspects of micro-dynamics which we wish to focus on 
briefly are qualitatively the same in both descriptions, we will limit our discussion to quantum 
mechanics (Caldirola [1974]).  
In order to adequately understand the significance of what we intend to demonstrate, it is necessary 
first of all to eliminate some classical prejudices, whose persistence has contributed in creating the 
myth of incomprehensibility of the quantum level of reality; a myth which is deeply rooted in many 
physicists.   
In the macroscopic world of daily life the distinction of an entity and its properties is obvious: the 
entity is, in a certain sense, the support of its properties. For example, a leaf is a different thing 
compared to its colour, its form, its dimensions, etc.  The group of properties of the leaf is not the 
leaf itself, intended as a material substance endowed with those properties. Therefore an object is 
considered to be a material support persistent in time and to which given characteristics can be 
attributed, independent of possible interactions with other objects.  
The situation of a micro-entity such as an elementary particle, an atom or a molecule, is completely 
different: a micro-entity is nothing other than the connection of two particular events, one following 
the other in time.  The first event is the creation (that is the physical manifestation) of a determined 
set of characteristics (A), while the second event – chronologically successive to the first – is the 
destruction (physical de-manifestation) of a second set of characteristics (B).  Set A is the “initial 
state” of the micro-entity, while set B is its ”final state”.  These events are the effect of the 
interaction of the micro-entity with other micro-entities; for example but not necessarily, with those 
macroscopic aggregates of atoms which are measurement apparatuses (Fock [1978]).  
One should pay particular attention to the fact that during the interval between the first and the 
second event the micro-entity does not exist at all; in particular, it cannot be conceived as a 
corpuscle that follows a trajectory or as a wave that is propagated in space, the two modes of matter 
and energy transfer known in classical physics. Nor can it be conceived as a combination of these 
two modes, as various theorists of the 20th century (De Broglie, Vigier and many others) hoped, 
elaborating many different (and often internally inconsistent) models that have not been supported 
by experiment. 
Reducing the existence of the micro-entity to only two separate instants means that the micro-entity 
is not a persistent material object. Such condition is only apparently paradoxical: an elementary 
entity is by definition without an internal structure, therefore its “structure” can be defined only by 
its behaviour during the interaction with other similar entities. But the events “creation of A” and 
“destruction of B” are precisely interactions of the micro-entity with other micro-entities or 
aggregates of micro-entities, therefore it is only in these events that the “structure” of the micro-
entity can be and is manifested: it is manifested as the initial or final state of that micro-entity. To 
ask ourselves what is the state of the micro-entity in an intermediate instant has no sense, unless an 
interaction of the micro-entity with other micro-entities occurs at that instant; but in this case a new 
and completely different interaction scheme is defined, in which the micro-entity created in state A 
during the first event is destroyed in state C at the intermediate instant, with the creation of a new 
micro-entity in the same state C; a micro-entity which is subsequently destroyed in the final state B 
during the last event. 
In other words, the fact that the structure of the micro-entity is definable only during external 
interactions limits the possibility of defining its physical state only at those instants in 
correspondence to events of interaction; in all other instants the physical state of the micro-entity is 
not definable. For example, the position of the micro-entity is not defined, thus the micro-entity 
cannot be localised in space.  An important consequence is thus derived: the micro-entity cannot be 
viewed as a material substance that persists in time and is extended in space, support of its own 
characteristics. 
Therefore, the micro-entity is nothing other than the combination of characteristics A and B: it is 
not different from its initial and final properties evaluated during the only instants of its existence.  
And what types of properties are the elements of A and B?  They are physical quantities such as 
energy, angular momentum and linear momentum, etc. that describe the behaviour of the micro-
entity during the interactions when it is created or destroyed.  In this way, the properties created or 
destroyed during the interactions are in effect the labels of the interactions themselves. 
These ideas can be illustrated considering the particular formulation of quantum mechanics known 
as wave mechanics.  In such formulation, properties A and B are represented by the initial and final 
wavefunctions of the micro-entity, indicated by ψA and ψB respectively.  Two distinct deterministic 
and causal laws of the evolution of these wavefunctions are postulated, one towards the future or 
“forward” and the other towards the past or “backward”.  In the most simple case of relativistic 
systems without spin, these  two laws are represented by the forward and the backward Schrödinger 
equations. These laws define respectively the value of the function ψforward(t) for each instant t 
following instant tA when properties A are created, and the value of the function ψbackward(t) for each 
instant t before instant tB when the properties B are destroyed.   We can imply that: 
 
 ψforward(tA) = ψA , ψbackward(tB) = ψB ; 
 
but generally there is no direct relation between ψforward(tB) and ψB, nor between ψbackward(tA) and ψA 
. Consequently, we are not dealing with the time evolution of a single entity from the past towards 
the future, but with two distinct time evolutions of two distinct wavefunctions, one from the past 
towards the future, and the other from the future towards the past. 
Let’s investigate now the physical significance of the functions ψforward(t) and ψbackward(t).  First of 
all, we must say that from their values at times tA, tB respectively [that is from the functions ψA, ψB 
respectively] it is possible to mathematically derive the sets of observables A and B. Such 
possibility has lead physicists to incorrectly conclude that these functions represent the state of the 
micro-entity at time t intermediate between tA, tB, while no micro-entity exists at that instant at all.         
In effect, the conditions represented by the two relations illustrated above are the two initial 
conditions under which the two distinct Schrödinger equations can be solved, therefore they cannot 
be derived starting from such equations. If we admit to specify as “casual” everything that is not 
predictable through causal laws, these two initial conditions would therefore in effect be considered 
casual events. More precisely, we should be aware that the second condition, relative to the 
evolution backward in time, is in effect a final condition.  If the genuinely initial condition (i.e. the 
first one) is determined, for example as an effect of the preparation of the state of the micro-entity 
in a given experiment, the second remains undetermined.  Experience has taught us that this 
condition is manifested, at an arbitrary time tB, with a probability (understood as the frequency of 
its recurrence on an ensemble of trials with identical initial preparation) equal to: 
 
Probability (result of B at time tB given the preparation A at time tA) =   ⎜∫ ψB* ψforward(tB) ⎜2 , 
 
[where, for simplicity, the variables of integration and the constant of normalisation have been 
omitted]. This is the well known Born’s postulate, that affirms the casual and probabilistic character 
of quantum events such as the creation of A or the destruction of B.  The existence of a conditioned 
probability expressed in Born’s postulate should not surprise us: result B appears in an event of 
interaction between a determined micro-entity and other micro-entities and is therefore conditioned 
by the structure of the interaction and the initial preparation of that micro-entity. Therefore, the 
appearance of this result can not be a completely random event : it will be manifested with a 
definite and computable conditioned probability.  However, it is not a deterministic event.  Function 
ψB becomes the new function ψforward(t) for t = tB, a fact known as “quantum jump” or  “quantum 
leap”. 
In quantum mechanics we have therefore the association of two distinct evolutions: the 
deterministic and causal evolution of wavefunctions, and the probabilistic and acausal evolution of 
real quantum events.  An entire period of research was aimed at identifying a supposed “sub-
quantum” level of reality, governed by causal, deterministic and local laws; the hope was to derive 
the Born’s postulate from these laws as a statistical approximation.  This period ended with the EPR 
experiments of 1980-90, which finally demonstrated the impossibility of the project (D’ Espagnat 
[1980], Licata [2003]). 
A final note. The description of the micro-entity and the temporal evolution of wavefunctions 
mentioned above are completely symmetric respect to the direction of time: they do not distinguish 
the past-future direction from the opposite direction. However the physical quantities such as 
energy can be demonstrated to propagate from the past to the future, reproducing the usual 
chronological order of physical phenomena (Cramer [1980],[1986],[1988]; Chiatti 
[1994],[1995],[2005]). In any case, the existence of the final conditions on quantum processes 
introduces a sort of finality, if not teleology, in these processes.  Thus, we ask: what influence does 
all this have on macroscopic aggregates composed of an enormous number of micro-entities like, 
for example, living systems?   
Such aggregates are constituted of volumes in space where billions of billions of billions of 
quantum creation-destruction events occur every nanosecond.  In each event in which certain micro-
entities are destroyed other micro-entities are created and vice versa; therefore we are dealing with a 
very dense network of interactions in time and in space. 
Any “object” is really an aggregate of relatively constant aspects in this never-ending flow of 
events.  Therefore the “essence” of the object, which supports these aspects, is nothing else but this 
very flow of events. Only in the so called classical limit, that is in the case of an enormous amount 
of mutually interacting micro-entities, can the distinction between the material support and its 
properties be observed. It is at this level that the objects appear, and when we can talk about the 
“form” of the object and the “morphogenesis” in naturalistic terms. 
In the classical limit, the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics become the usual deterministic 
laws of classical physics.  The acausal evolution disappears and the causal evolution of the state of 
the system, described by the laws of Newton, Lagrange or Hamilton, remains.  We thus ask 
ourselves: does the acausal evolution really disappear or is it merely concealed by the language of 
the classical description ? 
 
 
Acausality and the “creativity of Nature” according to Pauli  
The laws of classical physics determine the temporal evolution of the state of an object. In the 
definition of this state, all references to “flow of events” (i.e. the essence of the object) is 
eliminated: references are made only to the invariable, or slowly variable, properties of this 
macroscopic flow.  Having adopted this level of description, the acausal component of events of the 
flow is concealed, in that it is hidden in the language used for the description. 
At this point let us make some considerations, before proceeding further.  In all evidence it appears 
that the search of an authentically creative1 or innovative activity of Nature cannot be performed at 
the purely macroscopic level of natural phenomena, because this is governed by the inflexible 
necessity expressed in the local, deterministic and causal structure of classical laws.  For example it 
is useless to search for a creativity in the hypothetical violation of the Newton laws in a 
phenomenon such as the mechanics of the opening of a flower: such phenomenon is correctly and 
rigorously described by these laws. The attempt made by many, and in which many research 
workers still insist on, to identify “biological laws” that would describe the biological phenomena, 
giving predictions different from those obtained from the application of known physical laws to the 
same phenomena, has ever been inconclusive and seems destined to total failure if aimed at 
introducing a sort of creativity of Nature. 
Creativity is something that is not a product of the past, and in the language of physical laws this 
means essential unpredictability. Only at the level of single quantum events constituting a 
macroscopic process can we find it, in the terms briefly described above. This was one of the last 
major ideas of Wolfgang Pauli; he believed (Peat [2000]) that Nature exercised a faculty of choice 
through the discontinuous variation of the quantum state, i.e. exactly the acausal process ψforward(t)  
→ ψB described previously2. 
Among the natural, and in particular biological, phenomena there are many in which a discontinuity 
of this kind (commonly known as, even though inappropriately, “quantum jump”) produces effects 
that can be amplified - by classical mechanisms within the system or organism - until they appear at 
a macroscopic level. These amplification mechanisms, therefore, connect the micro-world of 
quantum jumps (that have an acausal component) with the macroscopic world governed by classical 
laws, thus introducing in it a real novelty. Among the biological cases, we are reminded of the 
genetic point-like mutation, that can produce a mutant phenotype with macroscopically different 
characteristics from the wild phenotype; the transduction of a single optical photon in an 
electrochemical signal propagated along the neurons (culminating in a sensation), after its 
interaction with the rods and cones of the retina; in the embryogenesis, the modified growth of 
tissue produced from the division of a cell in which the DNA is mutated by a single direct 
interaction with ionising radiation. 
It is necessary to keep in mind that these phenomena do not violate the classical laws.  Simply, the 
primary events of the causal chains (i.e. quantum jumps) are considered, in the classical language,  
only in their aspect as cause of the following events, such as “random noise” or “external signals”, 
and not in their essence that includes an acausal aspect.  Paying attention exclusively to the causal 
relations between the consequences of the initial event, the simultaneously causal and acausal 
nature of the event itself (and then of the entire chain of consequences) is concealed.            
The concealment of acausality in turn prepares the concealment of synordering patterns between 
events, as we discuss in the following section.  
 
 
Levels of the implicate order 
If we look at the quantum level of reality, we understand that two distinct ontological levels are 
present: one evident and manifest, the other hidden. The manifest level is constituted by quantum 
jumps (interactions); they are manifest because they form the real substance of the physical world, 
and as such every possible entity “observer” or “observed”, consists of them. Subsequently there is 
the level of the connection between quantum jumps, formally described by the twofold temporal 
evolution of the wavefunctions that we previously mentioned. We are reminded that during the 
interval between the event in which the micro-entity is created and the event in which it is 
                                                 
1 Obviously, when we refer to creative activity of Nature we should not think of an intentional activity associated with a  
self-reflexive consciousness overseeing the phenomena, but of a sort of free self-determination of the phenomena 
themselves. 
2 Other authors, such as Wheeler and Just, have expressed analogous interpretations; see also Zeilinger [1990]. 
destroyed, the micro-entity does not exist as a localised object in space in any form.  The link 
between these two events seems to claim something magical, since it remains hidden. The point is 
that the two events are connected by a “nucleus” of physical reality which is beyond space-time.  
For example if the first event consists of the creation of properties A and the second event of the 
destruction of properties B, we will have the scheme : 
 
creation of A  ←  “nucleus”  ←   destruction of B. 
 
It seems justifiable to presume that properties B are “reabsorbed” by the nucleus de-manifesting 
itself from physical reality, while properties A are “expressed” by the nucleus manifesting itself in 
physical reality. Since every possible observer-observed system is constituted by expressions-
absorptions of this kind, the “nucleus” remains forever unobservable.  It is the primum mobile, the 
immobile cause of the physical realm; but it is, in itself, physically unobservable.  It is unobservable 
since each conceivable physical observation consists of events projected from it and reabsorbed in 
it. Peat [2000] therefore proposed to term it as “vacuum”3. 
If we assume the vacuum is unique and universal, all elementary physical events (i.e. quantum 
jumps) will be connected through it. Therefore, two of these could be generally connected by a 
couple of wavefunctions in the previously explained way, but could also be connected in a different 
way. In the first case they would be considered causally connected events, in the second case 
simply synordered.  It is obvious that the causal order is only a particular case of synorder. 
The term “synordering” was firstly introduced by Bohm [1980], who denominated the two 
ontological levels described at the beginning of this section respectively as “explicate order” and 
“implicate order”. At the level of implicate order, all the quantum jumps that form the entire history 
of the Universe (past, present and future) are potentially connected4, resulting in the entire physical 
Universe being formed of potentially synordered events. 
The potential connection of each single elementary physical event with all other past, present and 
future events, form a sort of significance of the event itself.  We cannot in this paper go into the 
bohmian analysis of the relationship between implicate and explicate orders; we refer to the original 
texts (Bohm [1980]), which remain unsurpassed in clearness and depth5. We limit ourselves to 
remember that such relationship is expressed generally by non local transforms, representing the 
whole in one of its parts; just as in a hologram, each fragment of which contains phase-coded 
information of the entire represented object. Similarly, the vacuum must correspond to an 
unobservable level in which all the information concerning the physical Universe in its entire past, 
present and future history is codified in compact form.  An essential difference with respect to the 
hologram is that, while it is static, in the present case the entire temporal domain is codified and 
therefore it is more correct to speak of holomovement.  Bohm found that an appropriate 
mathematical description of holomovement could be provided by a certain algebra, which he called 
holoalgebra.  The process of asymptotic convergence towards the complete identification of this 
holoalgebra is one of the characteristics of scientific research6.  
                                                 
3 However, the meaning of this term should not be confused with that intended by physicists as “vacuum” in field 
theory.  This latter case is simply concerned with the configuration of the minimal energy of the field, and therefore 
with a certain physical property, instead of the source of all the physical properties. 
4 For example, modifying the boundary conditions in a so called “delayed choice” experiment of quantum optics, the 
behaviour of a single photon present in the apparatus complies with this change, without any signal informing it of the 
event (Wheeler  [1980]).   
5 See also the interesting interview of Bohm by Peat and Briggs [1987].  Bohm died in 1992.  
6 On the possible identification between the “vacuum” as interpreted in this paper, the “implicate order” and the Jung’s 
“unus mundus” see in particular Peat [2000].  Bohm himself saw in the implicate order the common root of physical 
matter and psychical phenomena (Bohm [1980]).  This issue is relevant in order to extend the notion of archetype, that 
we are introducing here for the physical-biological domain, at the psychological domain, and to compare it with the 
homonymous Jung’s concept. See also Card [1996] and Mc Farlane [2000]. This fairly controversial argument 
(Fournier [1997]) will not be approached in this paper.  
 
The concept of metamorphosis according to Bohm and Goethe 
Even though the bohmian analysis has had a great impact on the metatheoretical interpretation of 
quantum formalism (Licata [2003]), its idea of metamorphosis (Bohm [1980]) has not been object 
of much attention by later academics.   
The idea is the following. A given type of explicate order (one that is manifested, for example, in 
form or in function of an organ or organism) is generally defined by a certain aggregate E of 
geometric transforms such as spatial and temporal translations, axial rotations, etc., that change the 
configuration of the process while remaining within the same explicate order.  
A metamorphosis M is a transform mapping the considered explicate order into a more implicate 
level of order; un optical analogy may be offered by the holographic imaging of a given object, 
which we have already seen to be non-local. Let us indicate with M-1 the inverse operation of 
unfolding the implicate order into a new explicate order; in the optical analogy, it consists of the 
projection of a three-dimensional image of the object through irradiation of its hologram with 
coherent light.   
Assuming this, the transform E’ = MEM-1 then transports explicate order E into a new explicate 
order E’, and can be called a similarity metamorphosis. The reason for this name, instead of the 
more conventional “similarity transform” indicated in the standard textbooks of abstract algebra, is 
the desire to underline the difference between transform that conserve the explicate order and 
metamorphosis that converts the explicate order into a certain implicate order and then eventually 
reconverts it to a new explicate order.  Transform maintains the causal and local structure of the 
dynamics of explicate order, while similarity metamorphosis codifies, in a given explicate order, 
information regarding the ”rest of the Universe” in a non-local way.  And it is in such codification 
that we can find the synordering of physical events. 
It is well known that the structure that Bohm proposes for the holomovement is the similarity 
metamorphic flow that alternates the enfolding of the explicate order into implicate order and 
unfolding of the implicate order into the explicate order.  The creation of the electronic state ψA at 
time tA, and the subsequent destruction of the electronic state ψB at time tB, causally connected by 
the dynamics described in the Schrödinger equations, are in effect interpretable as particular 
metamorphosis that connect, in a generally non-local way, events which are separated in space-
time. The movement of the electron is not the movement of a persistent material point in an external 
space environment, but the alternation of its enfolding (M) into the implicate order and its unfolding 
(M-1) into the explicate order, within a metamorphic process (Peat e Briggs [1987]). Therefore one 
can see that the causal connection is a particular case of similarity metamorphosis or, in other terms, 
a particular case of synordering. 
However, the concept of metamorphosis can be applied, without any substantial changes, also to the 
macroscopic structures of classical objects.   
It is possible, for example, that in a biological system specific combinations of quantum events (for 
example an extended group of coordinated mutations) could occur as the unfolding phase of a 
similarity metamorphosis which, during the enfolding phase, could have codified the state (non only 
in the present, but also in the past and in the future) of the entire system, of the species or of the 
environment.  Such events could then, via the causal amplification processes discussed above, lead 
to macroscopic modifications within the system, thus to metamorphosis in the biological usual 
sense of the term (in which we include the mechanisms of differentiation during ontogenesis and 
speciation during phylogenesis). Nothing of this will ever enter into conflict with the causal nature 
of the sequence of classical states of the system. 
Even though the comparison of different concepts matured in different historical periods and in 
different cultural contexts constitutes an undoubtedly hazardous operation, we believe it worth 
noting the convergences between the concept of metamorphosis developed by Bohm and that 
elaborated by Goethe. Regarding this subject the introduction by Stefano Zecchi to a collection of 
Goethe’s works, focused on the Metamorphosis of Plants, (Goethe [2005]) is remarkable.  Goethe 
was aware that an object, bearer of its own form, is in itself flow and movement.  As Zecchi 
elucidates: “The metamorphosis of plants emphasizes that the form is immersed in the becoming 
and we can perceive it during its metamorphic process. In the Steigerung (the ascending process of 
the composition of parts) the form is not determined through an abstraction, or a progressive 
rarefaction of its material nature; the mere existence of form requests a continuous renewal of this 
nature. It is this metamorphic re-materialisation that keeps the breath of life within the form. This  
does not occur in a linear time, but in a cyclic time with a beginning and an ending. The classical 
concept of time can be seen in the Goethe’s idea of metamorphosis: the law governing the 
development of phenomena has nothing to do with history; its time is a constant present that 
includes both past and future. The study of metamorphosis and its rules aims to make explicit what 
is stable and eternal within the contingency. The Steigerung of forms is not therefore linear 
movement in time, but circular movement around its own starting point.  Birth and death represent 
the metamorphosis of what is self-identical, stable and eternal, but that also has life”.  
And again “ . . . Arber has also suggested the most correct way of scientifically interpreting the 
phenomenon of metamorphosis: it must be intended not as a visible phenomenon, but as a process 
of transformation which operates within the same transformative force.  Metamorphosis is therefore 
not a material phenomenon, but an immaterial process in which its effects are perceived in certain 
particular cases . . .” 
The idea of metamorphosis presents itself spontaneously in two important research areas in biology, 
that is the ontogenesis and the phylogenesis. And it is well known that Goethe applied it in these 
areas.   
In the last section we attempt to re-propose this approach, that was dismissed in the 19th Century. 
 
 
Archetypes and causal description 
An important point to emphasise is that metamorphic transformations are superposed on the 
ordinary causal temporal evolution of living systems, which is in reality none other than a particular 
aspect of metamorphic flow: the causal relation is only a particular case of synordering.  However, 
in general perspective the synordering is expressed as a sort of  “chance structure”. 
Naturally, while all events can be synordered because of their connection through the vacuum, not 
necessarily is each event synordered with each other in reality.  Actual synordering occurs by means 
of the (extra-temporal) metamorphic process.  The structure of metamorphosis is the pattern of the 
synordering to which it is associated.          
The actual patterns of synordering of events constitute what we will call archetypes. Archetypes can 
be represented mathematically, but such representation is not generally causal, because they are 
patterns in the implicate order. As we can see, such concept is significantly different from the 
platonic concept of “idea”, intended as a sort of “cast” or  “blueprint” of the manifestation process7. 
In particular, it should not be confused with Goethe’s Urbild, of what remains as an important 
example the Urpflanze (archetypal or model plant), that inspired Goethe during his travel in Italy.  
A more complete description of the natural world would attribute the same importance to the 
dynamics of the causal-temporal evolution of the single systems (typically described by means of 
differential equations of motion or variational principles) and the extra-temporal patterns of 
synordering – i.e. the archetypes – often represented as graphs and taxonomies.  As one can easily 
argue, this involves a new conception of the natural world in which contingencies are no longer 
mere casual accidents, not subsequently examinable and therefore of minor importance compared to 
                                                 
7 In this conception a logical contradiction arises, concerning the relation of inherence.  Let’s consider for example an 
atom of iron of the railway.  To which archetype it would be associated as its partial manifestation?  The archetype of 
“atom of iron”?  Of “railway”?  Of “planet Earth” (from which the atom was extracted)? Any object or entity can be 
seen as an element of distinct aggregates, each one, in platonic terms, associated to an “archetype”. That means the 
exclusivity of the relation of inherence to only one aggregate [the one which should correspond to the generative 
process of that entity] fails.  
the laws. As a consequence, the usual distinction between prescriptive (such as physics) and 
descriptive sciences (such as botany) disappears, remaining relatively valid only in the operational 
sense.  
In other words, we can claim that the existence of poppies is no longer an incident of  evolution.  In 
each instant of its growth, the quantum jumps constituting the “poppy” system can express  
information relative to the outline of the entire life cycle of the plant, of the outline of the entire life 
cycle of the poppy species, or to aspects of the environment in which it lives.  The amplification 
phenomena capable of reverberating these events at the macroscopic level, lead to the ontogenesis 
of the poppy that will no longer be an exclusively local, deterministic and causal process: it will 
admit non-local, acausal and authentically creative aspects.  An important part of scientific inquiry 
must then aim to isolate these aspects from the other merely mechanical ones: exactly the 
programme of Goethe. 
It is also evident that through the described processes, the environment can be codified in 
mutations, therefore the basic “casuality” of the background mutations could be in effect oriented 
from the environment; this could be the basis of an additional adaptation process other than the 
process of natural selection.  It may be that the environmental processes that exercises a selective 
pressure on the organism and the background mutations occurring in it are synordered.  If this is the 
case, we should look at the phylogenetic tree no longer as a map of evolutionary incidents, but as a 
partial mathematical representation (in fact it is a graph) of the archetype involved with the 
evolution of the biosphere on this planet.    
It is worth noting that such approach is not necessarily in conflict with the neo-Darwinian theories: 
it can represent a completion of them.  In fact the basic scheme of the casual mutation subsequently 
selected by the environment is not denied, but we simply affirm the possibility of an acausal 
connection between these two factors.  Naturally this does not exclude the fact that the neo-
Darwinian model could be extended along multiple directions as, for example, the Barbieri’s 
semantic theory (Barbieri [1985]). 
It would be interesting to consider biological phenomena, fundamentally inexplicable from a causal 
point of view, in the terms proposed in this paper.  An example can be seen in the migratory 
phenomena of birds. The fact is that the knowledge of the migratory destination cannot be 
genetically transmitted (the information is too detailed!) and that in some cases it is not transmitted 
by learning.  It could be that instead of “knowledge” to be “utilised” (possibly an anthropocentric 
preconception of the biologist) one should talk about the expression of a complex of reactions, 
codified at the archetypical level as part of the process consisting of that specific species of birds, 
aimed at determining a flight plan under certain external circumstances. These phenomena would 
therefore be associated to the spontaneous canalization of the manifestation on selected lines, a sort 
of “impersonal intentionality” that reminds us of the Chinese doctrine of Chi. 
In conclusion, we must mention an issue that is too complex and delicate to be rigorously analysed 
in this article: what instruments are available to distinguish the causal aspects from acausal ones in a 
determined dynamical system?  There is no simple answer, but the question is unavoidable if one 
wishes to make scientific and then testable hypotheses. 
It is evident that synordering can induce constellations of coordinated events which, in its absence, 
would be extremely improbable. Therefore, wherever it is possible to identify such constellations 
and statistically estimate their improbability, the quantification of the level of confidence to find 
oneself in front of synordering phenomena is possible. Of course, this is a rather indirect and a 
posteriori procedure, but we must keep in mind that the synordering connects the implicate order to 
the explicate order, and that our capability of effective control and observation is limited to the 
latter. 
For instance, it is possible to make conjectures that well known sudden jumps of biological 
evolution, involving the simultaneous appearance of numerous distinct and independent but 
coordinated mutations, capable of expression in a functional and favourably adapted phenotype, are 
phenomenon of this kind. 
Naturally, much theoretical and experimental work is necessary to arrive at secure conclusions.  But 
the stakes are a deeper understanding of the natural world going beyond the supposed absolute 
character of causality (recently restated through the myth of “intelligent  designs”). 
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